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Abstract
We introduce the concept of a “Blind Bernoulli Trial,” a noninteractive protocol that allows
a set of remote, disconnected users to individually compute one random bit each with
probability p defined by the sender, such that no receiver learns any more information
about p than strictly necessary. We motivate the problem by discussing several possible
applications in secure distributed systems. We then formally define the problem in
terms of correctness and security definitions and explore possible solutions using existing
cryptographic primitives. We prove the security of an efficient solution in the standard
model. Finally, we implement the solution and give performance results that show it is
practical with current hardware.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Distributed systems sometimes require users to make random choices to drive network
behavior. For example, peer-to-peer anonymous systems such as Freenet [12], AP3 [26],
and DiscountANODR [36] employs a random “coin flip” in routing decisions to help obscure
information about the path of a request from an observer. Opportunistic routing protocols
may use a random decision on whether to forward or cache certain content or not. Systems
that do rely on users making coin flips usually model the coin flip as a random trial that
produces a single bit with a fixed probability. They distribute the probability of the trial’s
two possible outcomes either as a static, pre-defined parameter known to the whole network,
or as a dynamic parameter distributed to users as cleartext.
However, in some instances the trial probability itself may be sensitive information. For
example, if we use dynamic trial probabilities to prioritize certain content in a network
(i.e., have some content forwarded with higher probability than others), then observers
can distinguish and target higher-priority content. If an anonymous communication system
varied the probability of forwarding to fine-tune the trade-off between performance and
anonymity for individual messages, then a malicious node could selectively attempt to
deanonymize easier traffic.
For such applications we can envision a cryptographic solution that allows each user to
carry out only a single trial and obtain a random bit with some weighted probability, while
learning as little as possible about the overall probability of each outcome. The user should
not be able to repeat the trial for a different result, since users can easily approximate the
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probability using multiple results. Nor should they be able to use the trial parameters to
learn anything more about the actual probability of the outcomes. Users should be able to
perform a trial noninteractively, as they would if the probability were distributed in cleartext.
In other words, we want a way to distribute a weighted coin that each user can flip once,
while revealing as little information as possible about the weight of the coin. We call this
construction a “Blind Bernoulli Trial, or BBT.”
Specifically, we propose a definition where an authority generates and distributes unique
keys to individual users. For each trial, the authority generates an encrypted tag that
corresponds to the desired probability for that trial. Given a user key and a tag, one
can noninteractively compute the outcome of exactly one trial without learning the overall
probability.
We formalize the security of this system with a simulation-based definition inspired by the
usual definition of semantic security for a cipher. Informally, the definition states that any
function that can efficiently be computed by some number of identities and trial parameters
could also be computed only knowing the trial results. The definition also includes a “leakage
function” to allow schemes that leak some information but still have near-ideal security. The
leakage function formally quantifies and places an upper bound on the amount of information
an attacker can gain.
This work evaluates three BBT schemes. First we develop a very simple protocol that
meets our definitions and is based on a semantically secure cipher. This scheme essentially
encrypts one trial result per user. We discuss why this trivial solution is unsatisfactory
and then show an alternative construction from a general functional encryption primitive.
Finally, since no practical functional encryption scheme for general functions is known, we
examine more specific functional encryption schemes that support only a limited class of
functions. We show how to construct a near-ideal BBT scheme from functional encryption
supporting only inner product predicate functions, for which practical schemes currently
exist.
In section 6, we compare the security of the ideal BBT schemes with the inner product
construction using a quantitative attack analysis, discussing what an attacker can learn
about the trial probability given a certain number of trial results. We design and evaluate
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a simulation of an attacker’s perspective on both possible schemes, using the different
information available to the adversary in each case. The attack simulations show that the
information gained by an attacker for the inner product scheme, on average, is very similar
to the information gained in the ideal case.
Since efficiency is a major concern, we discuss both the running time and storage
requirements for the inner product scheme. To evaluate the feasibility of current inner
product functional encryption schemes, we implement a recently proposed scheme in software
(to our knowledge, the first implementation of this scheme) and provide benchmarks for each
algorithm involved in a Blind Bernoulli trial scheme. The benchmarks show that a Blind
Bernoulli Trial scheme based on inner product encryption can run in a reasonable amount
of time on current hardware.
Finally, we explore in more detail some potential applications of this new cryptographic
concept. We discuss two possible distributed-systems scenarios where random behavior is
used and the probability of that random behavior is sensitive information. In these cases,
Blind Bernoulli trials can enhance privacy in the distributed system by hiding the weighted
probabilities from users.
1.1 Related Work
Protocols for remote parties to agree on a random bit in a way that is fair and verifiable go
back decades in cryptography [6]. These protocols differ from BBT in that their goal is to
prevent either party from biasing the result. BBT is almost the opposite: here we explicitly
want one party to be able to bias the result and for the other party to be unable to determine
the bias.
More generally, secure multi-party computation (MPC) encompasses a wide body of
related work that deals with allowing remote parties to interactively perform arbitrary
computations together. MPC focuses on protocols that enable distrusting parties to jointly
compute a function on private inputs, without revealing the inputs to each other. It allows
for private inputs from both parties, and protocols are interactive, proceeding in multiple
rounds. Existing MPC schemes can be practical [31]. Our formulation of BBT does not allow
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interactive protocols, and the only private input is the probability of the trial. Therefore
BBT is not compatible with MPC solutions.
While BBT does not fall under the area of MPC, it does fit squarely within the functional
encryption model. Section 4.1 gives additional background on functional encryption and
shows how BBT can be instantiated using general functional encryption.
In contrast with MPC, no practical general functional encryption is known. Recent works
have proposed general functional encryption schemes, although these are not yet practical
[15]. Other works have focused on implementing efficient functional encryption for specific
classes of functions such as inner products and polynomials [18]. This paper primarily focuses
on building an efficient construction specifically for BBTs.
4
Chapter 2
Blind Bernoulli Trials
A Bernoulli trial models a random process with two possible results, where each result
occurs with a fixed probability. This has applications in some distributed systems. For
example, it provides a very simple means for one user to direct the behavior of a certain
percentage of others without knowing exactly how many there are and without needing direct
communication. An authority can distribute the parameters for a trial, and users can run a
Bernoulli trial with the given parameters to self-organize into groups of approximately the
desired proportions.
However, in some cases it may be important to the security goals of the system that
individual users do not learn the overall probability of success. In these cases it is not
acceptable for an authority to distribute the parameters for a trial, since this directly reveals
the overall probability of success to all users. In response to this need, we formulate the
concept of a Blind Bernoulli Trial, or BBT, which allows each user to obtain a single pseudo-
random trial result without revealing additional information about the overall probability of
success.
At first glance, it might appear that trivial solution would be for the authority to run
the trials on a trusted computer and individually send a different trial result to each user.
Since a user sees only their result, this scheme is secure. However, this scheme does not
meet the requirement that a BBT be noninteractive. This leaves it with an important
drawback compared to an unencrypted Bernoulli trial (publishing the probability parameter
in plaintext). For an unencrypted Bernoulli trial, the authority can publish the probability
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parameter once, and any number of users can run a trial or forward the trial parameters
to other users. Instead, the trivial interactive solution forces the authority to open an
individual communication channel for each user. As a result, this interactive solution presents
scalability concerns for systems where communication between the authority and users may
be intermittent or costly.
Ideally, a BBT scheme should more closely mirror the properties we get with a
noninteractive unencrypted Bernoulli trial. The authority should be able to publish an
encrypted object that represents the trial parameters and any number of users should
be able to use this object to obtain a trial result without further interaction with the
authority. Therefore, a Blind Bernoulli Trial scheme will try to construct “tags” that
represent encrypted trial parameters of varying probabilities. Users will be able to use
these tags to conduct trials without interaction with the authority.
In order to hide the overall probability of success for a trial, users must be able to obtain
only one trial result per tag. If users could run multiple pseudo-random trials with the same
tag they could quickly approximate the probability of success. To avoid this, we require that
trial results are deterministic on a per user basis. In other words, the same user will always
compute the same result for a given tag. Since Blind Bernoulli Trials must be deterministic,
they are not true Bernoulli trials and do not have a “probability” of success in the same
sense. Instead, when using a BBT, we are more interested in the overall probability of a
trial’s success across a distribution of users. Accordingly, when we speak of the “probability”
of an outcome of a Blind Bernoulli Trial, we are referring to the probability of that outcome
when a trial is performed with a user key that is selected at random from the set of users.
For schemes that require the authority to store key material for each user, the “set of users”
refers to the set of user keys kept by the authority. Otherwise, it refers to the set of all
possible user keys.
Just as a single user must always get the same result for the same tag, it is also necessary
to prevent one entity from controlling many user identities and utilizing them to perform
multiple trials on a tag. For this reason, it must be impractical for an adversary to create
multiple working user identities. We avoid this by introducing a master key that is required to
generate new user identities. These identities take the form of a user key, which is combined
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with the tag to conduct a single trial. In general, an adversary should not be able to create
a user key without the master key. The impact of collusion is discussed at length in Section
6.
Taking into account these properties, we can arrive at a clearer picture for what our
scheme must look like: in a cryptographic Blind Bernoulli Trial scheme, an authority uses a
private master key to generate and distribute user keys representing individual user identities
and tags, each representing a Bernoulli trial with a fixed probability of success prescribed by
the authority. Given a user key and a tag, there exists a public, deterministic procedure to
compute the result of a single Bernoulli trial (either “success” or “failure”) without revealing
to the user the probability of success associated with the trial.
Formally, a Blind Bernoulli Trial encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ): Accepts a security parameter λ and returns a master key sk and public
parameters pk.
• KeyGen(sk): returns a user key uk.
• TagGen(x): takes a probability parameter x and returns a tag t; the exact form of
the probability parameter can vary depending on the construction. In order to be
useful, there must be at least two possible probability parameters that create tags
with different probabilities of success.
• Trial(uk, t): returns a single bit b indicating success or failure.
This definition does not allow the trivial interactive solution mentioned earlier, where
the authority carries out trials and directly communicates results to each user individually.
This reflects a key design goal: that users must be able to obtain trial results without online
communication with a centralized infrastructure. Users must be able to transfer tags to each
other and each tag must be usable by all users. This allows individuals in a disconnected
distributed system to obtain trial results without needing a direct intermediary.
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2.1 Security Definition
Inherently, a BBT must reveal some information about the underlying priority. For example,
an adversary that seeks to distinguish high-probability trials from low-probability ones could,
after generating a trial result for a tag with their user key, guess “high-probability” for
successful trials and “low-probability” for unsuccessful ones. Such a trivial adversary could
already achieve non-negligible advantage in distinguishing between two types of tags.
Since each trial result unavoidably reveals some information about the underlying
probability of success (a single successful trial means that the trial is more likely to have a
higher probability of success), our security definition must take into account this inherent
information leakage. Also, our definition must take into account collusion, so that the scheme
remains as secure as possible even when a single adversary controls multiple user identities.
Therefore, we compare the information an adversary learns from some number of user keys
to that learned by an adversary that learns only the trial results corresponding to those keys.
Informally, a Blind Bernoulli Trial scheme is secure if an adversary with access to x user
keys and y tags learns no more about the probabilities of success of any tags than he would
by being given only the results of x trials for each tag. Since a BBT scheme intends to
reveal the outcome of 1 trial per key, clearly this is the best any scheme could hope to do.
In Section 6 we discuss some possible attacks when an adversary controls multiple keys and
quantify the amount of information gained by such an adversary.
Formally, we use a simulation-based definition to capture the idea that any function
which is efficiently computable from a trial tag and a set of user keys must also be efficiently
computable using only the trial results. We also include some allowance for additional
information leaked, as this will be useful later in constructing a scheme that achieves near-
ideal security with much greater efficiency compared to other schemes.
Definition 2.1 (Security with leakage). A Blind Bernoulli trial scheme is secure with respect
to a leakage function L if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms A, there
exists a PPT algorithm B such that for all polynomially-bounded functions f, h, the advantage
of A, defined as:
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Pr[A(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn, t, h(1λ, x))) = f(1λ, x)]−
Pr[B(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn,Trial(uk1, t),Trial(uk2, t), . . . ,
Trial(ukn, t),L(t), h(1λ, x)) = f(1λ, x)] (2.1)
is negligible in the security parameter, where x is the probability parameter and t =
TagGen(x).
This definition is closely-related to the usual definition of semantic security for private-key
encryption and formalizes the idea that an adversary should learn as little as possible about
a tag beyond the results of the trials of all keys known to the adversary. The leakage function
places an upper bound on the amount of information that an adversary can learn from a
tag because the definition states that any function that can be efficiently computed with
the tag t can also be efficiently computed with only the trial results (which are intentionally
revealed) and L(t).
Implicit in this security definition is the design requirement that an adversary can not
forge additional user keys. If a BBT system allowed an adversary to forge a non-zero number
of additional keys, that adversary would gain access to an extra set of trial results beyond
those generated from their originally controled keys. Such a system fails to meet our security
definition.
Other Design Goals
Security is a necessary property, but it is not the only design goal. To be usable, a BBT
scheme must be efficient, both in terms of the running times of the algorithms and the
space complexity of keys and tags. As stated previously, we also require that the protocol is
noninteractive; that is, that tags can be freely transmitted from user to user and that users
can obtain trial results from a tag without direct communication with the authority.
Each algorithm must be efficient enough to run in a reasonable amount of time. The
running time of the Trial algorithm is particularly important, as we expect this algorithm
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to be run most frequently. Each user must run a trial for each tag received. Also, several
applications of BBT feature users with lower computing resources compared to the authority.
The other algorithms that comprise a BBT scheme are likely to be run less often: Setup is
run only once, or only when the system needs to be re-keyed. And if n tags are created
and m users then we expect the number of trials run to be on the order of nm if most users
receive most tags.
The size of objects in the scheme must also be efficient. “Efficient” tags and user keys
should require space logarithmic or at least sublinear in the number of users. In order to
minimize storage requirements for the authority, we would also prefer that the tag generation
algorithm does not depend on the current state of users. This eliminates the need for the
authority to keep a database of users, and also allows user keys to be used even with tags
that were generated before the key. This is particularly important in distributed systems
applications that are disconnected or high churn, where new users may regularly encounter
tags that were generated before the user key.
Another potentially desirable property would be the ability for users to generate tags.
We consider this property desirable because if it is not wanted it can easily be removed by
composing tags with any cryptographic signature scheme. Users can then simply reject tags
that do not have a valid signature from the authority. On the other hand, it is not clear
how to add this property to a scheme that does not support it, so we consider a scheme that
does allow user tag generation to be more flexible.
A less-obvious but important property of a BBT scheme is the possible probability values
for a tag. There is no requirement that a scheme support an arbitrary probability, but only
that TagGen accepts some parameter that increases or decreases the probability of success
for trials resulting from the generated tag. A scheme that allows more fine-grained control
of the probability level is preferable over one that supports more limited probability levels.
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Chapter 3
Construction from
Semantically-Secure Encryption
3.1 Construction
A simple BBT scheme can be trivially constructed from any symmetric or asymmetric
encryption scheme that is semantically secure. In short, the authority can simply generate
and store a random key for each user and send a tag consisting of a different ciphertext for
each user, which that user can decrypt to obtain a trial result with the corresponding user
key. To run a trial, users simply decrypt the ciphertext corresponding to their key. The
security of this scheme follows immediately from the semantic security of the underlying
encryption system.
Either a public-key or symmetric system can be used here, as it long it meets the definition
for semantic security. A symmetric-key system will be especially efficient, but a public-key
system has the advantage that users can generate tags themselves. On the other hand, if a
symmetric-key system is used, then the same keys that create tags can also decrypt them,
which means that only the authority can hold the keys needed to create tags.
The individual algorithms are described as follows:
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Setup
The authority initializes sk as an empty list of encryption keys.
Generating User Keys
The authority generates a decryption key uk for the underlying cryptosystem, gives it to the
user, and appends its corresponding encryption key to sk (in the case of a symmetric system,
the encryption key may be the same as the decryption key).
Generating Tags
A single tag consists of a set of ciphertexts, with one ciphertext per user. The authority
generates it as follows:
1. The authority randomly selects a subset S containing x of | sk | users.
2. For each uki in sk, the authority computes cti ← Encryptuki(msuccess) if uki ∈ S,
otherwise cti ← Encryptuki(mfail)
3. The tag is a tuple of all cti: t← (ct1, ct2, . . . , ct| sk |)
4. The probability of success for the tag is x/| sk |.
Trials
To perform a trial, a user selects the ciphertext corresponding to that user’s key from the
set of ciphertexts that forms the tag. The user then decrypts that ciphertext to obtain the
trial result:
1. m← Decryptuki(cti).
2. Return 1 if m = msuccess.
3. Otherwise, return 0.
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3.2 Discussion
Since a trial consists only of a single decryption, trials are very efficient. User key generation
is likewise extremely efficient as it requires only choosing a random key. Trials and user
key generation are both O(1). However, generating a tag is linear in the number of users,
requiring l encryptions for l users. The space complexity of tags is also O(l). When the
number of users is known to be small, this may be acceptable. However, especially because
BBT schemes are designed for applications where network resources are extremely limited,
the linear space complexity of tags may quickly become a concern as the number of users
increases.
This type of BBT scheme also allows for the most fine-grained possible control of
probability. The tag generator can select any subset of users of any size for a successful
trial. This is contrast to the schemes proposed in Sections 4.1 and 5, which are both limited
in the possible subsets of users that observe a successful trial.
This scheme does not meet the design goal that tag generation does not depend on user
state. The authority must maintain a central database of all user keys. If an asymmetric
key system is used to allow tag generation by users, this key storage burden is also placed
on each user. Each tag will be valid only for the user keys that existed in the authority’s
database at the time the tag was generated, so it will not be possible for newly-created users
to run older tags.
13
Chapter 4
Construction From Functional
Encryption
4.1 Construction
A BBT scheme with ideal security can be constructed from any functional encryption scheme
that supports arbitrary functions. In functional encryption, given a key k and ciphertext
ct, one can learn the output of a function of the plaintext fk(m) without learning anything
else about the plaintext [8, 30, 2]. To construct a BBT scheme from a functional encryption
primitive, we define the user key functions using a pseudorandom function family (PRF)
and a comparison. The tag plaintext consists of a random seed and a threshold value which
determines the tag’s likelihood of success. The authority encrypts tags under the functional
encryption scheme and distributes the ciphertexts to users. Each user key corresponds to a
function f that is defined as:
f(s, t) = 1 if h(s) < t (4.1)
= 0 otherwise
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where h is a function selected at random from a PRF for each user key. Although the
domain and range of functions in PRFs are typically viewed as bit strings, for our purposes
it is more convenient to view them as integers in binary representation.
Setup
The authority initializes the functional encryption scheme and retains the master key sk
which allows the creation of function keys.
Generating User Keys
The authority selects h at random from a PRF and generates the user key uk as the function
key for f , as described above.
Generating Tags
The authority selects a seed s at random from the domain of each function in the PRF. The
threshold t controls the probability p of the tag and is computed as p ∗max(range(h)). The
authority then encrypts the tuple (s, t) under the functional encryption scheme to obtain
the ct.
Trials
To perform a trial, a user computes f(s, t) using the tag ct and the user key uk. The trial
result is the function output.
4.2 Discussion
Although this construction achieves best-case security and allows fine-grained choice of
success probabilities, its description relies on functional encryption for arbitrary functions.
While such schemes do exist, they in turn rely on other heavy-handed approaches such as
fully homomorphic encryption for which practical implementations are not yet available [15].
Therefore, a more practical solution is needed.
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Chapter 5
Construction from Inner Product
Encryption
In this chapter we show how to use any fully attribute-hiding inner product encryption
(IPE) scheme to construct a BBT scheme that is secure with respect to the leakage function
L(t) = pk, where pk is the public key of the IPE scheme used.
5.1 Background
The term “inner product encryption” has been applied to multiple related but distinct
cryptographic concepts [21, 5, 28, 29, 27, 19, 3], In this context, we use it to refer to a
specific form of predicate encryption where ciphertexts and keys are each associated with
vectors, and the associated predicate is the inner product function. Predicate encryption is
a generalized form of public key encryption where each key k is associated with a predicate
function fk, and each ciphertext is associated with an attribute x [18]. A ciphertext with
attribute x can be decrypted with key k if and only if fk(x) is true.
In general, an IPE scheme operates on n-dimensional vectors of integers modulo a prime
p. In an IPE scheme, each key sk~k is associated with a vector
~k ∈ Znp , and each ciphertext ct~y
is associated with an attribute vector ~y ∈ Znp . The associated predicate is f~k(ct~y) = ~k ·~y
?
= 0.
In other words, given sk~k and a ciphertext ct~y, one can compute the plaintext m if and only
if ~k · ~y = 0. An IPE scheme consists of the following functions:
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• Setup(1λ) outputs public key pk and secret key sk.
• KeyGen(~x, sk) accepts the secret key sk and a vector ~x ∈ Znp and outputs sk~x.
• Encrypt(m,~y, pk) outputs ct~y.
• Decrypt(ct~y, sk~x, pk) outputs m if ~x · ~y = 0, otherwise outputs ⊥.
Attribute-hiding IPE additionally requires that the vector ~x associated with each
ciphertext is hidden. Partially attribute hiding schemes hide ~x from users who are not
authorized to decrypt the associated ciphertext, while fully attribute-hiding schemes hide ~x
even in the case where ~x · ~y = 0.
IPE security is defined by a game between a challenger and an adversary [28].
Definition 5.1 (Attribute-hiding IPE Security). The security of a fully attribute-hiding IPE
scheme is defined by the following game between the challenger and an admissible adversary
A
1. The challenger runs SetupIPE and gives pk to A, retaining sk.
2. A adaptively makes any polynomial number of key queries for key vectors ~ki. The
challenger gives A sk~ki ← KeyGen(~ki, sk)
3. A chooses challenge attribute vectors (~y0, ~y1) and challenge plaintexts (m0,m1),.
4. The challenger randomly selects a bit b = 0 or b = 1.
5. The challenger gives A Encrypt(mb, ~yb, pk)
6. A can again adaptively make a polynomial of key queries for additional key vectors ~ki.
7. A outputs a guess b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
Here, an admissible adversary is defined as one whose queries adhere to at least one of
the following conditions:
1. ~ki · ~y0 6= 0 and ~ki · ~y1 6= 0 for all ~ki
17
2. m0 = m1 and either ~ki · ~y1 6= 0 and ~ki · ~y0 6= 0 or ~ki · ~y0 = 0 and ~ki · ~y1 = 0 for all ~ki.
Without these restrictions an adversary can trivially infer b by submitting a challenge
attribute pair that will be possible to decrypt for one value of b and not possible to decrypt
for another, or a challenge message pair that can be decrypted to a different value depending
on b.
5.2 Construction
With attribute-hiding IPE and its security now defined, we can show how to construct a BBT
scheme using it. Intuitively, we will construct user keys and tags from randomly sampled
vectors. Tags will correspond to IPE ciphertexts, user keys correspond to IPE user keys, and
trials correspond to IPE decryptions. A successful decryption means a successful trial, while
a failed decryption indicates a failed trial. We will vary the number of nonzero components
in a tag’s associated vector to control the probability that a randomly-selected user key will
be able to decrypt it. Because the IPE scheme is fully attribute-hiding, the vector associated
with tags is hidden from users, regardless of trial result.
Setup
The Setup function for IPE-based BBT additionally accepts a paramter a that determines the
number of nonzero components in each user key. The authority runs the following procedure:
1. Run SetupIPE(1
λ, n) to obtain the private key sk and public key pk.
2. Store a as a public parameter.
3. Select msuccess randomly from the message space of the underlying IPE scheme, and
store it as a public parameter.
Generating User Keys
Every user key has the same number of nonzero components, which is parameterized as a.
1. ~k is randomly selected from the set of all vectors with a nonzero entries.
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2. uk is computed as KeyGenIPE(~k, sk)
Generating Tags
In this scheme, TagGen accepts the integer probability parameter 0 < x < n, which represents
the number of nonzero components in the tag vector:
1. ~t is randomly selected from the set of all vectors with x nonzero entries.
2. t is computed as EncIPE(msuccess,~t, pk).
Trials
1. m← DecIPE(t, uk, pk).
2. Return 1 if m = msuccess.
3. Otherwise, return 0.
5.3 Security
Theorem 5.2. The IPE-based BBT scheme is secure with respect to the leakage function
L(t) = pk.
Proof. The proof is simulation-based. For all PPT adversariesA(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn, t, h(1λ,~t))) =
f(1λ,~t) there exists a PPT simulator that achieves the same advantage using only the trial
results and the public key:
B(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn,Trial(uk1, t),Trial(uk2, t), . . . ,
Trial(ukn, t), pk, h(1
λ,~t)) = f(1λ,~t)
The simulator B produces an output that is computationally indistinguishable from that
of A. The algorithm for B proceeds as follows:
~s← 〈1, 1, . . . , 1, 1〉
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for 1 ≤ j ≤ n do
~vj ← 〈0, 0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0, 0〉 where only the jth element is 1.
tj ← Encrypt(~vj, pk)
end for
for all uki do
if Trial(uki, t) is success then
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n do
if Trial(uki, tj) is not success then
~sj ← 0
end if
end for
end if
end for
s← Encrypt(~s, pk)
Run A(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn, s, h(1λ,~t))) and output the result.
The output of algorithm B described above must be computationally indistinguishable
from the output of A; otherwise, an adversary could leverage the difference in the two to
break the security of the underlying IPE scheme as follows:
1. Choose ~t as an arbitrary vector.
2. Submit arbitrary key vectors ~k1, ~k2, . . . , ~kn.
3. Choose ~s as it would be computed by B (i.e., the vector with the maximal number of
non-zero entries that is still orthogonal to all ~ki orthogonal to ~t).
4. Choose plaintext m = msuccess.
5. Submit challenge attribute vector (~t, ~s) and challenge plaintext (m,m) and receive x,
which is t if b = 0 or s if b = 1. Note that these submissions are admissible under
the security definition of IPE because ~s and ~t are specifically constructed such that
~s · ~ki = ~t · ~ki for all ~ki, as is required when m0 = m1.
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6. Compute outA ← A(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn, x, h(1λ,~t))).
7. If outA is as A(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn, t, h(1λ,~t))), output 0.
8. Otherwise, if the output outA is as A(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn, s, h(1λ,~t))), output 1.
Clearly, if the adversary has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the outputs of
A(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn, t, h(1λ,~t))) (which is exactly the output of the adversary A) and
A(1λ, uk1, uk2, . . . , ukn, s, h(1λ,~t))) (which is exactly the output of the simulator B), then the
adversary also wins the IPE security game with non-negligible advantage. But, for a secure
IPE scheme no such adversary can exist. Thus no PPT algorithm exists that can distinguish
the output of the simulator B from the output of the A.
5.4 Choice of Parameters
Besides the choice of underlying IPE scheme, the IPE-based BBT scheme also allows the
choice of parameters for the dimension of the vector space n and the number of nonzero
components a in each user key. Choices of these parameters will affect the number users
that the system can support as well as the available choices for tag probabilities.
The IPE construction uses the number of nonzero components in a tag vector to control
the probability of a successful trial. Therefore, for a system of dimension n there are n
discrete probability “tiers” where tags in the ith tier have i nonzero components. Given
an IPE scheme of dimension n, a nonzero components in each user key, and x nonzero
components in a tag, the odds of a successful trial are:
Pr[success] =
(
n− x
a
)
/
(
n
a
)
Here, the numerator counts the number of ways to choose a user key that is orthogonal
to the tag, and the denominator represents the total number of user keys possible.
This means that the probability tiers are not distributed uniformly. There are more tiers
with lower probabilities of success than there are tiers with higher probabilities of success.
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For applications that require higher probabilities, we can simply invert the result of all trials
to get a more favorable distribution. The remainder of this section follows this convention
of inverting trial results. As a concrete example, figure 5.1 visualizes the case where n = 64
components are used.
Figure 5.1: The distribution of probability tiers is biased toward the upper end of [0, 1]
(using inverted trial results with n = 64, a = 8).
Two user keys uk1 and uk2 are called functionally unique if there exists a tag t such that
Trial(uk1, t) 6= Trial(uk2, t). In other words, at least one of the associated key vectors has
at least one non-zero component that is zero in the other vector, so that it is possible to
construct a vector that is orthogonal to one but not the other. The number of functionally
unique user keys depends on the number of components n and the choice of number of
non-zero components in each user key a and is given simply as:
(
n
a
)
=
n!
a!(n− a)!
Table 5.1 compares the tag size in bits for IPE-BBT and the alternative scheme described
in section 3.1. For the underlying IPE scheme, we used the state-of-the-art attribute-hiding
IPE scheme due to Chen et al. [10] (our implementation using this scheme is discussed further
in section 7). We assume a 1024-bit prime is used, for security equivalent to a symmetric
key of 112 bits [16]. Chen’s IPE scheme requires 4n+4 group elements for a ciphertext in an
n-dimensional IPE scheme. We assume that group elements can be represented compactly
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Table 5.1: Sizes of tags in a system supporting a given number of users in IPE-based BBT
using Chen’s IPE scheme, compared with semantically secure cipher construction using ECC
ElGamal variant.
Dimension n Users IPE Size ElGamal Size
(bits) (bits)
9 9 41000 4050
10 45 45100 20250
11 165 49200 74250
12 495 53300 222750
16 12870 69700 5.8× 106
32 1.1× 107 135300 4.7× 109
64 4.4× 109 266500 2.0× 1012
by specifying only the x coordinate plus one bit indicating the y coordinate [25]. Thus the
total size of a tag using Chen’s IPE scheme is (1024 + 1)(4n+ 4) for IPE dimension n.
For comparison, we selected a public-key cryptosystem that represents minimal realistic
storage requirements for a public key scheme at a comparable security level. We instantiated
the semantically-secure encryption with an ECC variant of the ElGamal cryptosystem, which
has been proven secure under elliptic curve discrete log assumptions [20]. This cryptosystem
requires 2 group elements per ciphertext. We assume a 224-bit curve for a comparable level
of security with the IPE scheme, again equivalent to a symmetric key strength of 112 [4].
This requires a total of 450 bits per ciphertext. The IPE scheme that supports 165 users (11
components with 8 non-zero user key components) uses less space than the corresponding
public key scheme.
The number of possible tags is defined in the same way as it is for user keys. Two
tags t1 and t2 are functionally unique if there exists a user key uk such that Trial(uk, t1) 6=
Trial(uk, t2). The number of functionally unique tags is different at each probability tier and
depends on the total number of components in the vector space n and the number of nonzero
components x used for that probability tier:
(
n
x
)
Therefore, it may be desirable to restrict the minimum and maximum probability tiers
used so that the number of functionally unique tags at any probability tier does not fall
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of available probability tiers with IPE dimension n = 64 with
various values of a (nonzero user key components). Lower values of a give greater flexibility
in probability choice but support fewer users.
Table 5.2: Comparison of available probability tiers with IPE dimension n = 64 with
various values of a (nonzero user key components). Lower values of a give greater flexibility
in probability choice but support fewer users.
Nonzero User Key Components Users (to nearest power of 2)
4 219
8 232
12 241
below a chosen minimum. This means that the number of practically usable probability
tiers may be less than n. For example, if one uses n = 64 components then one may only
use tags with at least 8 components and no more than 56, which ensures that the number
of functionally unique tags in any probability tier is at least
(
64
8
) ≈ 232.
The number of nonzero components a in each user key also affects the range and number
of probability tiers: lower values of a allow a wider range of probability tiers, but fewer
functionally unique user keys. Individual applications will need to determine a suitable
trade-off. Figure 5.2 visualizes the available probability tiers and number of user keys by the
number of nonzero user key components.
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Chapter 6
Practical Security
In practice, the security of any BBT scheme will require that an adversary does not have
access to too many keys. With enough keys, it is possible for an adversary to approximate
the trial probability. As with any distributed system, the security of BBT in a system will
break down if an adversary compromises enough nodes. In this chapter we first consider
ways an adversary might attempt to compromise a system and then develop a model that
quantifies the amount of information an attacker learns about trials based on the number of
compromised nodes.
One of the most obvious way an adversary may attempt to compromise a system is
a Sybil attack. In a Sybil attack, a single adversary creates multiple fake identities and
appears to the network as many users instead of one [14]. Fortunately, there are wide range
of known defenses against Sybil attacks for different domains. The authority can attempt
to manually attempt to verify node identities before issuing user keys. In cases where this
is impractical, automated defenses exist. Social network-based defenses such as SybilGuard
[38], SybilLimit [37], and SybilInfer [13] are capable of detecting Sybil nodes using the
social relationships between nodes in the network, under the assumption that attackers are
unable to create many trust relationships with legitimate users. Behavior-based schemes
seek to distinguish between real and Sybil nodes via behaviors such as network activity
and movement. For example, both work by Abbas et al. [1] and Jan et al. [17] utilize the
heterogeneity of radio signals to detect Sybil attackers in MANETs and Wireless Sensor
Networks respectively. Puzzle-based defenses such as SybilControl [22] utilize a proof of
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work based approach to mitigating Sybil attacks. Lastly, new approaches which leverage
smart contracts, such as that proposed by Bochem et al. [7] put an economic price on Sybil
identities.
Another simple attack is possible if a protocol misuses BBTs. For example, if a protocol
requires multiple trials at the same probability protocol, then even a single user may be
able to gain significant information about the probability of the associated tags. If a user
observes several tags and knows (either from protocol specification or otherwise) that the
tags all use the same probability parameter, then the user may use the differing results from
the tags to approximate their shared probability.
In the event that an attacker does obtain multiple trial results, it is critical that we
understand how much can be learned. The following sections analyze the amount of
knowledge that an attacker gains from multiple trial results, in both the ideal and the
practical IPE schemes. Whether or not this amount of information leakage is considered
acceptable is ultimately application-dependent.
6.1 Attacks on the Ideal Scheme
In an ideal BBT construction, the adversary learns only the trial results corresponding to
the keys that it holds. If the adversary with n keys has no auxiliary information about
the underlying distribution of success probabilities, then its best estimate for the success
probability of a tag is x
n
where x is the number of observed successes. A confidence interval
can also be computed to measure the uncertainty in this estimate. As an example, Figure
6.1 shows the upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval on a tag with p = 0.5 as
the number of the adversary’s keys increases. The confidence interval is computed assuming
that the adversary’s trial results approximate the true tag probability as closely as possible,
which is the best possible case for an attacker. We use a normal approximation to compute
the confidence interval. Figure 6.1 shows that the attacker’s knowledge increases with more
trials. The attacker gains information rapidly at first, but trials beyond the first 10-15 bring
diminishing returns. After 100 trials, the adversary is 95% confident that 0.4 < p < 0.6.
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Figure 6.1: The upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval for the probability
of a tag with p = 0.5, as computed by an attacker whose trial results approximate a 50%
success rate as closely as possible.
However, if the adversary has a priori information on the underlying distribution of
success probabilities, then the calculation is different. For example, if an adversary knows
that all tags are drawn from discrete probability tiers (as in the case of the IPE-based
scheme), then the adversary can use Bayesian inference to compute the likelihood that a tag
comes from any tier given the a priori knowledge and the trial outcomes. Bayes’ theorem
gives the likelihood that a tag is from tier T given trial results R as:
P (T |R) = P (T )P (R|T )
P (R)
(6.1)
where P (T ) is the prior likelihood of a probability tier T , P (R|T ) can be modeled as a
binomial distribution, and P (R) can be computed as
∑
P (R|Ti)P (Ti) for each probability
tier Ti. This represents, from the adversary’s point of view, the likelihood that a tag comes
from a given probability tier given the observed trial results. This serves as an effective
measure of what the adversary knows about the probability of a trial associated with the
tag.
Figure 6.2 shows the expected view of an attacker in the ideal discrete case for two
different tags in a simplified model that includes only 4 probability tiers. The tiers used are
selected at roughly equal intervals from the tiers available in the IPE scheme with n = 64,
and are listed in table 6.1. The attacker’s confidence in each probability tier was computed
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Table 6.1: Distribution of tags used in analysis.
Nonzero Components Trial Probability Prior Likelihood
9 0.725 0.25
11 0.800 0.25
16 0.898 0.25
56 1.000 0.25
Figure 6.2: An attacker’s view of two tags in the ideal discrete case, using a simplified
model with 4 probability tiers. Each graph shows the attacker’s expected confidence in each
probability tier as a function of the number of trial results available to the attacker. The
left graph shows the case where the true probability of the tag is p = 0.725, while the right
graph shows a tag with p = 0.8.
using the Bayesian model outlined above and taken as an average over all possible attacker
trial results (weighted using the binomial distribution for the likelihood of each result). We
assume that each probability tier is equally likely to an attacker as a prior likelihood. As
the number of trial results available to the attacker increases, the confidence in the true
probability tier increases while the confidence in other tiers decreases.
6.2 Attacks on the IPE Scheme
We know that with ideal security, only the trial results are learned. In the IPE scheme,
additional information is leaked (constrained by leakage function in the security proof). We
wish to quantify how much an attacker can learn from the trial results, and how much more
can be learned from the leaked information in the IPE scheme.
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Essentially, the attacker can use information about the location of nonzero components
in user keys to narrow down the set of possible tags. Knowing the components in each user
key, together with their trial results for a tag, allows the attacker to quickly rule out any tag
configurations that are inconsistent with the observed trial results.
The leakage function of the security proof takes this into account by allowing the public
key of the underlying IPE scheme to leak. Since the public key is intentionally public in
an IPE scheme, clearly this does not break the security guarantees of the underlying IPE;
however, it does allow an adversary to potentially learn more about tags than the ideal case.
Recall that the IPE public key allows one to encrypt a message under an arbitrary vector
and obtain the ciphertext. In a BBT scheme, the IPE ciphertexts corresponds to BBT tags.
Therefore, an adversary with the IPE public key can generate arbitrary tags, which allows
the adversary to test user keys (but not tags) for the presence of any non-zero components.
By repeated testing an adversary can determine exactly which components are zero and
nonzero in each user key. In the rest of this analysis we assume the worst-case; that is, that
the adversary already has access to the upper bound of information allowed by our security
proof.
If an adversary knows which components in each user key are nonzero, then it can narrow
the set of possible tags to those that give the same trial results for the same keys. Now, the
adversary can estimate P (R|T ) as the proportion of possible tags from a tier that produce
the same results when combined with same set of keys. For example, if trial result of testing
a tag with one user key indicates that the two vectors are orthogonal, then any tags that
share a nonzero component with the key are eliminated as possibilities. The attacker can
count the number of consistent tags at each probability tier, and divide by the total number
of possible tags in that tier to obtain a better estimate of P (R|T ). Again, P (R) can be
computed as
∑
P (R|Ti)P (Ti). The adversary can then again compute the overall likelihood
that a tag comes from a given probability tier using the Bayesian inference described by
equation 6.1.
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6.3 Comparison
In order to determine the true impact of this attack, we compare the security of the IPE
scheme to the ideal case by modelling two adversaries that each calculate the likelihood
of tags differently. The component-aware adversary uses the full knowledge of the user
keys components to compute the exact number of tags in each probability tier that could
have produced the observed trial results, and then combines this with the prior likelihood
of each probability tier to produce a confidence that a given tag comes from a given tier.
Remember that no PPT adversary could hope to further distinguish between possible tags
that would have produced the same trial results, since this directly contradicts the IPE
security definition.
On the other hand, the naive adversary uses only the number of success and number of
failures to compute the likelihood of probability tiers. The likelihood of an observed result
given a probability tier is modeled only as a binomial distribution. This is the best that an
adversary could hope to do under the ideal security definition, where only trial results are
revealed.
Figure 6.3 shows a comparison of the two attacks in one case. For simulating the two
attacks we chose parameters that provide a reasonable balance of performance, security, and
number of users supported: n = 64 as the dimension of the IPE scheme and a = 8 for the
number of nonzero components per user key. For simplicity, we limited tags to only a set
of a few that provided roughly evenly-spaced probability tiers from about 0.72 to 1.0, in
0.10 intervals. Table 6.1 lists the exact tags used. For the prior distribution of tags, each
probability tier was assumed to be equally likely.
For each attack, we sampled a given number of random keys, ran the attack with the
keys on a randomly sampled tag at each probability tier, and then reported the resulting
computed distribution of tag likelihood for each tag. We repeated this process many times
to obtain an average over uniformly random sampled n keys and tags sampled randomly
from our distribution of probability tiers. Shannon entropy, defined as −∑ pi log(pi) can be
used as a measure of the uncertainty over a distribution [33]. After each sampled attack,
we computed the entropy of the computed probability tier distribution. We then computed
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Figure 6.3: Expected Kullback-Leibler divergence between the component-aware model
and the naive model as a function of attacker’s number of keys.
the average expected entropy over the sampled sets of user keys and tags and graphed it as
a function of number of user keys held by an attacker. Figure 6.3 shows that the difference
in the attacker uncertainty is minimal between the ideal and IPE schemes. The expected
entropy in a tag distribution from an attacker’s point of view diminishes with each additional
key known, and it diminishes slightly faster for the IPE-based scheme than it does in an ideal
scenario.
We also computed the expected Kullback-Leibler divergence between the component-
aware model and the naive model, using the same tag distribution and random sampling
method. The Kullback-Leibler divergence between two distributions P and Q is defined as
−∑ pi log(piqi ). This divergence measures the amount of information that an attacker gains
about a tag probability by exploiting the information leakage in an IPE-based BBT scheme.
Figure 6.3 shows that the additional information leaked to an attacker is minimal and quickly
levels off around 0.02 bits.
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Chapter 7
Implementation
We implemented IPE-based BBT using the adaptively attribute-hiding IPE scheme by Chen,
Gong, and Wee, which is the current state of the art [10]. Chen et al. propose multiple
variations with different performance characteristics using different standard assumptions.
We implemented the variant described in Section 4.4 of their paper, which is proved secure
under the external decisional linear assumption.
Under this scheme, tags and the public key both require space that is O(n) in the
number of dimensions, or O(log(l)) in the number of functionally unique user keys. User
keys have a constant space requirement of 7 group elements. Table 7.1 details the exact
space requirements for each object.
Setup, trials, user key generation, and tag generation all run in O(n) time. For a typical
number of dimensions, the trial run time is dominated by the pairing operations. Crucially,
trials in this scheme require only 7 pairing operations, regardless of the number of dimensions.
We tested the speed of this implementation on a single core of an Intel Xeon E5-2680
v4 CPU clocked at 2.40GHz. For pairing operations, we used the Stanford Pairing-Based
Table 7.1: Size of objects in IPE-BBT implemented with IPE scheme from Chen et al., in
number of group elements.
Object Size, in elements
Public key 8n+ 16
User key 7
Tag 4n+ 4
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Cryptography (PBC) library [23, 24]. The curve used was of PBC’s “Type A,” which are
curves of the form y2 = x3 + x over the field Fq, where q is a prime such that q = 3 mod 4.
q was chosen as a random 1024-bit prime, and the parameter r was chosen as a 224-bit
number. Since the curve has embedding degree k = 2, these parameters are equivalent to
the strength of an 112-bit symmetric key, according to the IEEE Standards for pairing-based
cryptography [16].
Although the performance of all BBT steps must be reasonable, the Trial step is of
the most concern. Trials are expected to be carried out by clients who may have limited
resources, such as mobile devices. In contrast, Setup, TagGen, and KeyGen are all expected
to be carried out by the single authority which would likely have access to significantly more
resources.
Figure 7.1 shows the runtime of each BBT algorithm in our implementation using Chen,
Gong, and Wee’s IPE scheme. As expected, each algorithm shows a clear linear trend as
the dimension is increased. As previously mentioned, the performance of the trial algorithm
is the most critical, since disconnected clients with limited computing resources will be
running it. Our results show that the trial algorithm is quite practical with parameters that
can support a large number of users. For example, with n = 64 dimensions and a = 8
nonzero components per user key, there are approximately 232 functionally unique user keys
and a trial takes about 29 ms.
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Figure 7.1: Runtimes for individual steps of IPE-based BBT implementation, by the
dimension of the IPE.
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Chapter 8
Applications
Any system that requires participants to take actions probabilistically can use BBTs to
enhance privacy. Specifically, we envision several possible applications for BBTS in secure
distributed systems. We provide two example scenarios that could benefit from deployment
of blinded Bernoulli trials.
8.1 Probabilistic Forwarding of Content in a Network
Some networks (especially peer-to-peer networks) employ random walks based on probabilis-
tic forwarding of content for privacy reasons. For example, in the anonymous communication
systems such as AP3 [26] and DiscountANODR [36], when presented with a message, nodes
randomly decide to either forward messages to another node in the mix or to send the
message directly to its destination. The random process of forwarding obscures the origin
of a message: when a node receives a message, it does not know if the message originated
from the immediate preceding node or if it comes from 1, 2, or more hops away from that
node. The use of the random coin rather than full circuit specification relieves the sending
node from having to maintain state about the network topology outside of its immediate
neighbors. The network uses a parameter p to specify the probability that nodes forward
messages on to another node.
This approach introduces a trade-off between anonymity and network overhead: for lower
values of p, messages take shorter paths (on average) through the network, but an observer
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can narrow down the set of likely originators to a smaller set based on the overlay distance
to mix nodes and the distribution of random walk lengths. Higher values of p increase the
number of possible nodes that might be the originator, but reduce network performance due
to longer random walks. The authors of AP3 propose p between 0.5 and 0.9.
Using BBTs we can construct a network that allows for differential service, providing
some users faster traffic, while still retaining the anonymity of longer paths. For example,
consider a system with two classes of traffic. The Priority Class wants higher performance,
and therefore shorter random walks, achievable with a low value of p. On the other hand,
the Slow Class has no performance demands, so it can tolerate a higher value of p, increasing
the size of its anonymity set. Without BBTs the traffic classes are trivial to distinguish, and
as a result Priority traffic can be analyzed in a vacuum, leading to small anonymity sets.
Marking a message’s p with a BBT means that the two classes can not be distinguished
based on this value, and in turn the faster class can benefit from the adversary’s uncertainty
about which peers should be included in the set of possible originators. This approach works
especially well when the majority of the traffic falls into the Slow Class.
To evaluate the utility of BBT in this system, we simulated a network that uses
probabilistic forwarding with two traffic classes. Priority traffic uses p = 0.5, while Slow
traffic in our test network uses p = 0.9. We simulated the operation of a network containing
1,000 nodes, with each node maintaining at least 4 connections to other nodes. The resulting
graph had an average mixing time of slightly more than 7. In this network, Priority traffic
represents 10% of total messages, and it is assumed that the adversary knows both the overall
proportion of Priority traffic in the network and the full network topology. As expected,
Figure 8.1 shows that Slow traffic takes drastically longer paths through the network, while
Priority traffic reaches its destination much quicker. If an observer can distinguish Priority
traffic, then this creates a privacy concern: because Priority traffic originates from nearby
nodes with high probability, a node that receives it and recognizes it as Priority traffic has
a high degree of confidence that the sender is in the small set of nodes that are nearby
in the topology. However, if a BBT scheme is used to blind the priority class of traffic in
the network, then Priority traffic can benefit from the reduced latency without resorting to
unacceptably small anonymity sets. As Figure 8.1 illustrates, using BBT in the network
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Figure 8.1: The distribution of path lengths and anonymity set sizes for traffic classes.
Priority traffic has shorter paths, but lower anonymity. Without BBT, the anonymity
set for nodes sending Priority traffic is less than 10% of the network. If the classes are
indistinguishable, the anonymity set size is more than 50% of the network.
increases the anonymity set sizes to levels that are near those of the Slow class. On average,
anonymity sets for the merged class of traffic resulting from BBT blinding of priority is
slightly lower than if only slow traffic is considered. This is because the adversary knows the
relative frequency of fast and slow traffic, and can adjust computation of likely nodes based
on this information.
Beyond the example systems of AP3 and DiscountANODR, many anonymous commu-
nication protocols feature a system parameter taking the form of a probability. Examples
include Freenet [12], Crowds [35], and Imprecise Routing [11]. In each of these protocols,
BBT can be used in a similar manner to adjust network behavior, allowing for different
security properties while blending in with standard traffic.
8.2 Intrusion Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks
Another application for BBTs is masking how many nodes are conducting a specific behavior.
As an example, consider a wireless sensor networks comprised of a large number of low-cost
embedded devices conducting measurements in an environment [32]. They rely on short-
range wireless communication between low-power devices (often battery-powered), which
makes power consumption a top concern. Because of the communication range constraints
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and large number of devices over a wide area, direct connectivity is limited; instead sensors
distribute messages from device to device over multiple hops in the wireless network.
Sensor networks deployed in a hostile environment face the additional complication that
certain compromised sensors may not be trustworthy. Adversaries may attempt to falsify
sensor readings from compromised nodes. Recent work has examined methods for detecting
compromised nodes in sensor networks [9, 34, 39]. In general, prior work has dealt with
detecting falsified results by comparing them to a consensus of trustworthy results, under
the assumption that an adversary is unable to compromise enough nodes to form a false
consensus.
Of course, building a consensus requires a large number of measurements. Again,
this leads to a trade-off between security and efficiency: employing many nodes in
redundant measurements to build a consensus raises the bar for an attacker, but each
sensor measurement uses energy (which is an extremely limited resource in wireless sensor
networks). An obvious compromise would be to perform some fraction of measurements
using only a small number of sensors, and sometimes use large-scale “audit” measurements
to provide the necessary data for intrusion detection. If the metadata associated with a
measurement reveals the number of nodes involved in the measurement, then this solution
is vulnerable to an obvious attack: an adversary can simply refrain from lying during the
audit measurements.
BBTs mitigate the aforementioned attack by limiting the adversary’s ability to distinguish
typical measurements from audit measurements. The authority can control the scope of
the measurement using the probability of a tag, and nodes can decide their involvement
in the measurement with a trial. This prevents the attacker from selectively influencing
measurements without detection. In addition, the authority can easily verify that nodes
are not returning results for spurious measurements by duplicating the deterministic trial
results and verifying that the node originating the measurement was in fact one of the nodes
directed to take the measurement.
We evaluated the effect of applying this technique on a small network of sensor nodes.
We modeled the network as 100 independent sensor nodes, each capable of a fixed finite
number of measurements before it is considered expired. The adversary controls one node.
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We assume that the malicious node is detected if it lies on a measurement that is performed
by at least half of the nodes. For normal measurements, the network uses a tag with p = 0.05.
For audit measurements, the network sets p = 0.6 (this ensures with high probability that
at least half of the network does actually perform the measurement). We also assume that
the authority verifies that each returned result is tied to an actual successful trial, which can
be accomplished by requiring that nodes attach their user key to each result, encrypted so
that only the authority can read it.
By varying the “audit rate” (the fraction of measurements that are audit measurements),
the authority can select an arbitrary trade-off between efficiency (conserving resources for
more useful measurements) and security (performing redundant measurements to detect
attacks). As the audit rate increases, so does the probability of detecting a malicious
measurement; on the other hand, as the audit rate decreases, the lifetime of the network
increases. Table 8.1 shows this trade-off. We sampled audit rates and computed both the
resulting sensor lifetime and the probability that the adversary is detected each time it lies.
The expected sensor lifetime is reported relative to the lifetime in the “safe” network (that
is, one with an audit rate of 1).
Because the adversary cannot distinguish normal and audit measurements, it cannot
selectively lie. This effectively limits the number of times an adversary can lie without
detection (with overwhelming probability). Without using BBT, the adversary is only
prevented from lying during audit measurements; otherwise, it can forge measurements
without detection indefinitely. With BBT, if the adversary has a 50% chance of detection
per measurement (for example) then it can expect to lie only about twice before detection,
on average.
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Table 8.1: The trade-off between sensor lifetime and detection probability. Allowing a small
probability of an undetected attack can significantly increase the lifetime of the network.
Audit Rate Probability of Detection Network Lifetime
0.0 0.00 12.0
0.2 0.71 3.7
0.4 0.86 2.2
0.6 0.93 1.6
0.8 0.97 1.2
1.0 0.99 1.0
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Although many distributed systems make use of probabilistic actions, systems so far either
specify the probability as a fixed parameter or reveal the varying probabilities to each
user. Blind Bernoulli trials are a privacy-enhancing measure that preserves the semantics of
Bernoulli trials across a set of nodes, while hiding the exact parameters from individuals.
Fundamentally, Blind Bernoulli trials reveal the trial outcome without revealing the trial
parameters. We create a definition that formalizes the idea that users should learn “no more”
about the trial parameters than they would by receiving only the trial results corresponding
to the keys held, and explore some possible solutions that meet our proposed definition.
Since BBTs are a special case of functional encryption (FE), they can easily be
implemented with any FE primitive that allows arbitrary functions. However, since practical
general functional encryption is not currently available, there is a need for a specific scheme
that achieves the same results with a more efficient algorithm. Existing forms of functional
encryption for specific classes of functions can be used to instantiate much more practical
Blind Bernoulli trials, albeit with some security loss. Specifically, we can construct a
near-ideal BBT scheme from inner product encryption by varying the number of nonzero
components in tags to control the probability of their trials.
We prove the near-ideal security of the IPE-based scheme under our definition by showing
a reduction to the security of the underlying IPE scheme. This definition takes into account
the security loss and places an upper bound on exactly how much information is revealed
to an adversary, even one who controls multiple keys. By simulating the attacker’s point of
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view on a large number of trials and keys, we can measure the average uncertainty towards
the distribution of possible tags for an adversary with multiple keys: the expected entropy
of a tag distribution decreases steadily with the number of trial results known. We compare
the entropy loss in the ideal case to the IPE-based BBT scheme and show that the additional
entropy loss in the IPE case is small.
Finally, we implement the IPE-based scheme in software and analyze its efficiency. We
show that, in a system with realistic parameters, trials can be executed in a reasonable
amount of time. Also, tags and keys in the IPE scheme are small (logarithmic in the number
of users). Even with a relatively small number of users (on the order of 100), this is less
storage than our simple semantically-secure cipher solution with linear keys.
We conclude that Blind Bernoulli trials can be efficiently implemented using IPE, and
that they are an effective way obscure probability parameter metadata. This paper proposes
two potential applications where this can prevent attacks that would otherwise exploit
knowledge of the probability parameter, and we hope that others in the security and
distributed systems communities will explore additional uses for the primitive.
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